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Summary –. This paper shows that countries which allow a dual citizenship status for their 
international migrants receive on average more remittances than others. Using a cross-section 
of 104 developing countries with data averaged over the period 2000-2008, I distinguish 
between the direct effect of the dual citizenship status (incentive to remit more) and an 
indirect effect which passes through migration incentives. Results indicate that the direct 
effect of the recognition of the dual-citizenship is higher. Finally, the paper shows that 
remittance inflows are more likely to foster private investment in receiving countries which 
recognize a dual citizenship status for their migrants. These results are robust to alternative 
uses of datasets on dual-citizenship codification and to the instrumentation of remittances in 
the private investment model.  
Keywords: Dual-citizenship, Remittances, Investment, Developing countries 
JEL codes: F24 F22 E22 O2 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International remittances represent one of the most important components of external 
capital flows received by developing countries. According to the World Bank (2011), 
remittances exceed the levels of external development assistance to developing countries. It is 
not only the levels of remittances that retain the attention but also their dynamic properties. 
Several studies pointed out the fact that remittances are more stable than the other component 
of private capital flows (Chami et al., 2008) and they are sometimes countercyclical vis-à-vis 
receiving country business cycle (Sayan, 2006; Frankel, 2010). Recent papers indicated that 
remittances often react positively to exogenous shocks for instance natural disasters (Yang, 
2008; Mohapatra et al., 2009; David, 2010). It is therefore not surprising to see that the 
literature on remittances has highlighted their strong impact on poverty reduction and 
stabilization (Adams, 2005; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2009; Chami et al., 2009; Combes and 
Ebeke, 2010). 
Beside these developmental effects of remittances, the literature also has analyzed the 
potentially negative effects of large remittance inflows. The results indicate that large 
remittance-to-GDP ratios are appreciating the real exchange rate (Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, 2004; Barajas et al., 2010) and expanding domestic corruption (Abdih et al., 2008). The 
literature has also focused on the determinants of international remittances. Among the 
receiving country determinants of remittances, it appears that the level of financial 
development at home (a proxy for the cost of remitting money), the domestic shocks (natural 
disasters, civil war, and inflation) and the level and the composition of migration in terms of 
qualifications do matter (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Adams, 
2009). Regarding the last factors, the results of the literature are that countries which export 
more migrant and unskilled migrants receive on average more remittances than the others. In 
contrast, a high level of financial development seems to positively determine remittances by 
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lowering transaction costs associated with remitting activities. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) also found that the level of financial development determines the positive effect of 
remittances on growth since remittances are more likely to be used for productive purposes in 
less financially developing countries. 
This paper revisits the literature on the determinants and the consequences of 
international remittances in developing countries. It explores the effect of the recognition of 
the dual citizenship status on the level of remittances received by each country. More 
specifically, the paper examines whether countries which recognize a dual citizenship status 
tend to receive more remittances than others and investigates whether the recognition of the 
dual citizenship determines significantly the utilization of remittances to achieve investments 
goals in the country of origin.  
At least four reasons justify this study. Firstly, this paper enters the debate on the 
effects of the citizenship status of the migrants on their remitting behavior. The paper by 
using a large sample of countries aims at measuring the between countries effect of the 
legislation on the dual citizenship recognition on remittance inflows. It therefore supplements 
the early evidence of Vadean (2007) who found that immigrants in Germany who have a dual 
citizenship tend to remit more to their country of origin than others. The paper is also close to 
the one of Leblang (2010). The author showed using panel data that the recognition of the 
dual-citizenship helps increase remittance inflows and the returns of migrants at home. In this 
paper, I test whether between differences among countries in term of the recognition of the 
dual-citizenship explains the between differences in remittance inflows during the last decade. 
I therefore base my analysis on a cross-sectional approach. This can also been justified by the 
fact that a large part of the variation in the dual-citizenship legislations is between countries 
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instead of within countries (only a small number of developing countries (9) changed their 
legislation on the dual-citizenship during the recent years, see Sejersen, 20082).  
Secondly, I distinguish between the ‘direct effect’ of the dual-citizenship (defined as 
the effect of the dual-citizenship obtained after holding constant, the between country 
differences in migrant stocks of adults) and the ‘indirect effect’ of the recognition of the dual-
citizenship on remittances which passes through the migration incentives. I also use the 
narrow definition of remittances as suggested in the International Monetary Fund Balance of 
Payments Yearbooks by taking only workers’ remittances to record the remittance variable 
and ignoring compensation of employees and migrant transfers. This strategy is retained 
because these two components sometimes recorded as remittances by authors do not really 
reflect the decision taken by a migrant to remit nor the migrant transfers of wealth represent 
flows but clearly a stock. Moreover, I test the effect of the dual-citizenship recognition on 
alternative measures of the dependent variable: remittances per capita, remittances in percent 
of GDP or in logarithm form. 
Thirdly, this paper is also different from earlier studies given that it quantifies the 
effect that the dual-citizenship exerts on the allocation of remittances into investment at home.  
The hypothesis tested here is that migrants with a dual citizenship are more likely to invest in 
their country of origin given they afford smaller transaction costs than others migrants getting 
only the nationality of the host country. Indeed, emigrants without a dual citizenship but only 
the citizenship of the host country may now require an entry visa for home visits, lose the 
right to buy or even own real property or start easily a business, and in the extreme they may 
experience discrimination in their erstwhile home country (Vadean, 2007). This might reduce 
                                                           
2
 According to Sejersen (2008) since the year 2000 the developing countries that changed their legislation in 
favor of the recognition of the dual-citizenship are the following: Afghanistan (2004), India (2004), Philippines 
(2003), Russia (2001), Belarus (2002), Lithuania (2002), Moldova (2003), Armenia (2004), and Hungary (2004). 
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the motivation of doing investments in assets (e.g. real estate) and business in the country of 
origin. Altogether, a country which recognizes a dual-citizenship (country A) to its 
international migrants can maximize the level of remittances sent for investment purposes 
compared to another country which do not recognize the dual-citizenship (country B). 
Suppose that both countries A and B export the same level of migrants abroad but that the 
composition of migrants originating from A is a mix of natives which have kept their former 
nationality (M1A) and natives with the both nationalities of their erstwhile home country and 
the host country (M2A). For country B, the composition of migrants is a mix of natives which 
have kept their former nationality (M1B) and migrants who have only the nationality of the 
host country and have lost their former nationality (M2B). It comes that the country A 
maximizes the potential level of remittances which is sent for investment purposes given that 
both M1A and M2A can start business at home without huge transaction costs while in 
country B, the migrants M2B are less incited to start business due to the additional transaction 
costs that the lost of their former nationality triggers.3 
One of the best alternatives to this outcome is dual-citizenship, status which provides 
rights in both the host and the home country. Dual-citizenship gives the migrant the best 
capacity to act transnationally, i.e. full access to the markets of both the host and home 
country and mobility between the two, status that could stimulate investments in the home 
country and the related remittances to relatives. Altogether, one would therefore observe that 
countries which recognize a dual-citizenship status to their migrants receive (i) more 
remittances on average and (ii) more remittances devoted to investment purposes.  
                                                           
3
 It is plausible that the migrants who have lost their former nationality can send remittances to their relatives at 
home and start business under their names. But this is based on the hypothesis that migrants fully trust their 
relatives and can engage large funds under their names. However, this hypothesis can be challenged according to 
papers examining the spread and the causes of the mistrust in developing countries (Nunn and Wantchekon, 
2009). 
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Fourthly, this paper uses several informations on the international recognition of the 
dual-citizenship. Indeed, as it has been pointed out by Blatter et al. (2009), given the very 
different definitions and scopes of the studies, it is not surprising that the results of the various 
studies are not coherent. Indeed, there are four studies with a large number of countries and a 
global perspective (US Office of Personnel Management, 2001, Renshon, 2005, Boll, 2007, 
and Sejersen, 2008) and these studies are very diverse in respect to the definitions, the number 
of countries included and the quality of information gathered. Some studies took into account 
the issue of the recognition of the dual-citizenship with treaty nations while those did not take 
into account these arrangements. Other studies recognize that some countries could ‘tolerate’ 
dual-citizenship (a form of de facto recognition) and all these discrepancies characterizing the 
four studies lead to different results regarding the spread of the dual-citizenship phenomenon 
around the world.  
One advantage of the work of Blatter et al. (2009) is to aggregate and merge the 
findings of the previous four studies and to finally propose a new classification of countries. 
They distinguish between the ‘full’ recognition (if the majority of studies concludes on the 
same way) and the ‘no’ recognition. Between the two parts of the spectrum they allow for 
some categories such as ‘tolerance and acceptance with treaty nations’ and countries with a 
‘very limited’ acceptance. In this paper, I take advantage of this recent codification. I present 
results obtained with the ‘full’ recognition and with the broad definition (merging the ‘full’, 
the ‘tolerance’ and the ‘very limited acceptance’ dimensions into a single dummy variable). 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. I start with the description of the empirical 
strategy devoted to quantify the effect of the dual-citizenship recognition on remittance 
inflows. The paper uses a large cross-section of developing countries (103) observed over the 
period 2000-2008. This period is chosen for at least two reasons. Firstly, by retaining the most 
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recent decade I use the most reliable data on remittances at the cross-country level. Secondly, 
using the period 2000-2008 reduces the self-selection bias that could be associated with the 
decision to modify the legislation on the dual-citizenship. Given that almost all the countries 
included in the sample have not changed their legislation during this period, this ensures that 
the effect of the dual-citizenship on remittances is not affected by the self-selection bias 
during this period. However, it remains 9 countries which have changed their legislation in 
the mid of 2000s and these countries could bias the results. For robustness purposes, I run also 
regressions by excluding these ‘switchers’ from the sample.  
Moreover, since the existing datasets on the dual-citizenship look at the dual 
citizenship regulations at the beginning of the 21st Century, this study would therefore provide 
evidence on the impact of earliest recognitions of the dual-citizenship and thus neglect the 
effect of the very recent innovations (recognitions occurred in 2008) for example. This can be 
justified by the fact that the innovations in the legislation act with a delay (due to effective 
implementation and enforcement costs). 
The results indicate that countries which recognize a dual-citizenship receive on 
average more remittances than others and this effect is the combination of an indirect effect 
(the dual-citizenship recognition increases incentive to migrate abroad and finally increase the 
stock of emigrants and remittances) and a direct effect obtained once I control for the level of 
migration stock. This effect captures the incentives to remit more due to the economic 
advantages of the dual-citizenship described above.  
Section 3 examines whether the positive elasticity of the private investment with 
respect to remittance inflows is conditional upon the recognition of the dual-citizenship law. 
The results obtained do not reject the hypothesis that the dual-citizenship matters. Section 4 
concludes on the policy implications of these results. 
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2. QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF THE DUAL-CITIZENSHIP RECOGNITION 
ON THE LEVEL OF REMITTANCE INFLOWS 
a) The econometric models 
I take advantage of the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances in 
developing countries (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Adams, 2009) to quantify the effect of the 
dual-citizenship. The following equation is specified: 
ijiiii MDXR εαδθβ ++++′= 11     (1) 
where R is either remittances per capita in $ US, remittance-to-GDP ratio, the log 
level of remittances per capita in $ US, and the logarithm of remittances in percentage of 
GDP. D is a dummy variable taking 1 if the country recognizes the dual-citizenship and 0 
otherwise,4 M is the log of migration of workers abroad (individuals born in their country of 
origin, aged 25+ and living and working abroad), X is the matrix of control variables (GDP 
per capita in the receiving country, GDP per capita growth in the host country,5 age 
dependency ratio and financial development6), jα  the vector of regional dummies and ε  is 
the idiosyncratic error term. According to the literature, the level of income would be 
negatively correlated with remittances while the proportion of inactive people, the stock of 
migrants abroad, the economic conjuncture in the host countries and financial development 
                                                           
4
 I use alternative measures for this dummy. I use the work of Blatter et al. (2009) by creating two dummies for 
the ‘full acceptance’ and the ‘broad acceptance’, respectively. 
5
 The GDP per capita growth in the host countries is computed as the weighted sum of the GDP per capita 
growth in each migrant destination countries with weights being the share that each destination country 
represents in the emigration of individuals originating from the country observed. Data on the bilateral migration 
shares are drawn from the World Bank website, Migration and Remittance Prospects. 
6
 The financial development variable and the dependency demographic ratio are expressed in log when the 
dependent variable is expressed in log. 
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(proxy for transaction costs in the remittance market) are positively correlated with 
remittances. i is the indicator of the country. 
1θ  in equation (1) identifies the effect on remittances of the dual citizenship status. Put 
differently, it measures the average differences in remittances in countries recognizing a dual 
citizenship versus countries that did not. This is the direct effect of the dual-citizenship since I 
already control for the level of migrant stock abroad. By doing so I ensure that the effect 
observed for the dual-citizenship is not driven by its positive effect on migration incentives.  
Because the dual-citizenship could also determine the level of remittance inflows 
through its indirect effect on migration (people living in countries which recognize a dual-
citizenship have more incentives to migrate abroad for work and to get a second nationality 
for themselves and for their children or spouses), the equation 2 is specified to quantify the 
‘total effect’ of the dual-citizenship on remittances. The indirect effect which passes through 
the increase of the stock of migrant abroad will be derived as the difference between the ‘total 
effect’ and the direct effect 1θ . The equation measuring the ‘total effect’ of the dual 
citizenship is the following: 
ijiiii MrDXR εαδθβ ++++′= 22    (2) 
with Mr being the component of the migrant stock variable not explained by the dual-
citizenship dummy. Extracting from M the potential effect of the dual-citizenship ensures that 
2θ  now measures the ‘total effect’ of D. It is worth noting that this transformation affects only 
the estimated coefficient ( 2θ ) on the dual-citizenship variable. Pagan (1984) shows that the 
two-step procedure, of estimating (2) gives asymptotically efficient estimates and the correct 
values for the standard errors.  
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In cases where the ‘transmission’ variable (the stock of international migrants) has a 
positive effect on remittance inflows, and the dual-citizenship dummy has a positive effect on 
migration, this method will provide for a larger coefficient on the dual citizenship in equation 
(2). If it transpires that the dual-citizenship is not a determinant of migration, there is no effect 
on the coefficient of the dual-citizenship. The indirect effect of the dual-citizenship which 
passes through the volume of migrants is given by  12 θθ − .  
b) Data 
The remittance variable records the money sent by migrants residing in host countries 
for at least one year. Data in $ US come from the IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook and are 
divided by each country total population. Information on the dual-citizenship laws were 
drawn from Blatter et al. (2009). All the other remaining control variables were drawn from 
the World Bank Tables. Data are again averaged for the period 2000-2008 for each country. 
The list of countries (with the information on the dual-citizenship recognition) and the 
descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the paper are presented in appendix. 
c) Dual-citizenship and the level of remittances: Econometric results 
(i) The direct effect of the recognition of the dual-citizenship 
The results of estimations are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. The method of 
estimation is the OLS estimator with a full set of regional dummies. In Table 1, I present the 
results obtained using the narrower definition of the dual-citizenship recognition (the ‘full’ 
status corresponds to countries in which all the available informations presented in the four 
studies mentioned in the introduction of this paper converge toward the same conclusion). 
The first four columns of the Table 1 indicate that countries which have allowed the dual-
citizenship status receive on average more remittances: 43 $US per capita more remittances a 
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year (column1), an additional 1.7% percentage point of GDP of remittances (column 2) and 
around 90% more remittances than the countries which did not recognize the dual-citizenship 
(columns 3 and 4). Interesting and expected results are also observed regarding the control 
variables. Indeed, the estimation results suggest that remittances are more likely to flow in 
countries which export a large number of migrants, in countries with high demographic 
dependency ratios and finally in countries with lower transaction costs associated with 
remittances. Moreover, in some specifications, it appears that a better economic conjuncture 
in the host countries affects positively remittances. 
[Table 1 about here] 
In the last four columns in Table 1, I exclude from the sample the countries which 
changed their legislation during the decade. Although these switchers had been taken in the 
analysis as countries allowing the dual-citizenship status, the results obtained before can be 
biased because these countries recognized the dual-citizenship belatedly compared to the rest 
of the sample for which the recognition was already enabled or not before the beginning of 
the period of analysis (year 2000). This corresponds to around 7 countries and excluding them 
does not really affect the previous results. Indeed, the results obtained in columns 5-8 are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the previous ones.  
In Table 2, I repeat the same exercises as previously but I use the second dummy of 
dual-citizenship (the broad codification which takes into account countries which tolerate or 
with a limited acceptance). The impacts quantified are a higher compared to those obtained in 
Table 1. Indeed, the results indicate that when I take into account the de facto recognitions, 
the effect of the dual-citizenship is stronger. Countries which fully recognize the dual-
citizenship or tolerate it receive 60 $US per capita more remittances or 3 percentage points of 
GDP more remittances than others. In terms of relative gap, these countries receive on 
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average the double of the amount of remittances received by the others countries (columns 3 
and 4). Even when I exclude from the sample the switchers, the results remain broadly 
unchanged.   
[Table 2 about here] 
(ii) The indirect and total effects of the recognition of the dual-citizenship 
To measure the total effect of the dual-citizenship and derive the indirect effect, the 
migration variable is replaced by its residual component obtained after controlling for the 
effect of the dual-citizenship dummy on migration. The results are presented in Table 3 and 
Table 4.  
In Table 3, I present the results obtained using the narrower measure (the ‘full 
recognition’). It appears that the coefficients associated with the dual-citizenship dummy have 
increased compared to its level observed in Table 1. As expected, it is worth noting that the 
coefficients and the standard-errors of all the remaining variables included in the model did 
not change. The shift of the coefficient associated with the dual-citizenship dummy suggests 
that its impact on remittances is the combination of one ‘direct effect’ and one ‘indirect effect’ 
through the migration channel. Knowing that the coefficient estimated in Table 3 measures 
the ‘total effect’ of the dual-citizenship on remittances, the ‘indirect effect’ is therefore 
computed as the difference between the ‘total effect’ and the ‘direct effect’. This ‘indirect 
effect’ represents around one-quarter of the ‘total effect’. These results are not affected by the 
exclusion of the switchers from the sample (columns 5-8).  
[Table 3 about here] 
In Table 4, I replace the ‘full recognition’ dummy by the ‘broad recognition’ dummy. 
The results highlight an increase in the magnitude of the coefficients associated with the dual-
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citizenship dummy. This result suggests that even with this definition of the dual-citizenship, 
the hypothesis that the effect is the combination of two direct and indirect effects is not 
rejected. The indirect effect is obtained by taking the difference between the coefficients of 
Table 4 and the coefficients of Table 2. It appears that the indirect effect corresponds to 
around one-fifth of the total effect, the remaining effect being due to the direct effect. This 
result is also robust to the exclusion of switchers from the sample.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Altogether, the effect on remittances of the recognition of the dual-citizenship is 
primarily due to what I called the ‘incentive effect’ to remit more since it is easier for 
migrants with dual-citizenship to start business at home and monitor it by travelling 
frequently. In the next section, I test empirically this proposition that remittances are more 
likely to be channeled into investment in countries which have recognized a dual-citizenship 
for their migrants. 
3. DUAL-CITIZENSHIP, REMITTANCES AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN 
RECEIVING COUNTRIES 
This section tests empirically whether remittances are more likely to foster the private 
investment ratio in receiving countries which have recognized officially a dual-citizenship 
status. In the previous section, I addressed the issue of the relationship between the citizenship 
law and the level of remittances. I turn now on the relationship between the dual citizenship 
law and the cross-country differences in terms of invested remittances. 
a) The econometric model 
The following model describes the effect of the dual-citizenship on the elasticity of the 
private investment ratio with respect to the remittance ratio: 
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( ) ijiiiiii DDRRXI εαθθθβ +++×++′= 543    (3) 
where I represents the private investment-to-GDP ratio, R the log of the remittance-to-
GDP ratio, D is the dual citizenship dummy, and X is the few set of control variables 
generally introduced in the private investment equations at the macroeconomic level (Serven, 
2003). I therefore control for the inflation rate, the public investment-to-GDP ratio, the private 
credit-to-GDP ratio, the level of public debt service-to-GDP ratio, the level of trade openness, 
and for the political stability index. 
In equation (3), the coefficient of interest is 4θ  which measures the differential 
elasticity of private investment with respect to remittances in countries which recognize a 
dual citizenship (D = 1) versus countries that did not (D = 0). 04 >θ  suggests that remittances 
increase the most private investment when the migrants can enjoy a dual-citizenship. Put 
differently, this means that remittances are more devoted to investment purposes in countries 
which recognize the dual-citizenship status for the natives. Finally, 3θ  measures the effect of 
remittances on investment in countries which do not recognize the dual-citizenship status for 
their migrants (D = 0). 
b) Identification strategy 
The main shortcoming that characterizes the estimation of the equation (3) is 
neglecting the plausibility that remittance inflows and the private investment are 
simultaneously determined. I therefore resort to the instrumental variables approach in which 
I allow for exogenous sources of variations in remittances. I use as instruments for 
remittances the remittance-to-GDP ratio for each country in 1995 and the GDP per capita 
growth rate in host country.  
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My identification assumption is that the level of remittances in 1995 and the economic 
conjuncture in the host country are exogenous and determine the private investment ratio only 
through remittances after controlling for my set of explanatory variables. For instance since I 
already control for the trade openness, I reduce the possibility that the economic conjuncture 
in the host countries could affect the private investment in receiving economic through other 
channels of the globalization. Finally, the validity of the instrumental variables approach will 
be assessed through the Hansen overidentification test and through the first-stage F-test 
statistics. 
The second endogenous variable is the interactive term of remittances crossed with the 
dual-citizenship dummy. This variable is instrumented by the instruments of remittances 
crossed with the dual-citizenship dummy.     
c) Data 
The private and public investment variables are drawn from the IMF-World Economic 
Outlook database. The quality of institutions measured by the indicator of political stability 
comes from the World Bank Governance Indicators dataset. All the other explanatory 
variables are drawn from the World Bank Tables. 
d) Dual citizenship, remittances and private investment: Econometric results 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. In Table 5, I 
present the results obtained using the ‘full recognition’ variable while in Table 6 I use the 
‘broad recognition’ dummy.  
In Table 5, I begin first by presenting the results obtained using the OLS with regional 
dummies method (column 1). The result indicates that the differential impact of remittances 
on the private investment between countries recognizing a dual-citizenship and the other 
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countries is positive and highly significant (the coefficient stands at around 0.4). The 
coefficient of the additive term of remittances which identifies the impact of remittances in 
countries which do not recognize the dual-citizenship status, is not statistically different from 
0. Finally, the sum of the coefficients of the additive term and the multiplicative term of 
remittances leads to a globally positive impact of remittances in countries recognizing the 
dual-citizenship status. 
[Table 5 around here] 
In column 3, the causal effect on remittances is measured by performing a two-stage 
least squares estimations in order to reduce the endogeneity of remittances. Column 2 presents 
the results of the first-stage regression of the instrumentation of remittances.7 The diagnostic 
statistics associated with the first-stage regression do not reject the hypotheses that the 
instruments are jointly strong and not correlated with the residuals of the second-stage (F-stat 
and Hansen OID p-value). The results obtained from the second-stage regression confirm the 
hypothesis that remittance inflows are more likely to be positively correlated with the private 
investment ratio in countries which recognize the dual-citizenship. Indeed the coefficient of 
the interactive is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the sum of the two 
coefficients associated with remittances (which identify the effect of remittances on 
investment in countries which recognize the dual-citizenship) is positive and statistically 
significant.8  
In column 4, even after excluding the switchers (countries which have changed their 
legislation in the mid of 2000s), the result that the effect of remittances on investment is more 
                                                           
7
 It is worth noting that the variable remittances*dual-citizenship has been also instrumented by the same set of 
instruments introduced linearly and non-linearly. The results are not shown but are available upon request. 
However, I present at the bottom of Table 5, the F-test of instrumentation of the multiplicative variable. 
8
 The F-statistic test of the joint significance of these coefficients rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
are jointly equal to zero. Results are available upon request. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.02 
 18
positive and significant in countries which recognize the dual-citizenship status is not rejected 
by the data.  
In Table 6, I replace the ‘full recognition’ dummy by the ‘broad recognition’ dummy 
and run the same estimations. Whatever the method used (OLS or IV, including or excluding 
the switchers), the results remain qualitatively unchanged. Countries which enable the dual-
citizenship status for their natives receive more remittances channeled into investment 
purposes compared to the others remittance-dependent economies. 
[Table 6 around here] 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper examined the role of the recognition of the dual-citizenship on both the 
level of remittance inflows and the utilization of remittances in receiving economies of the 
developing world. It mobilizes a large cross-section of countries (103) observed over the 
period 2000-2009 and finds that countries which recognize a dual-citizenship status receive 
x% more remittances than others. Moreover, the results also highlighted that remittances are 
strongly channeled into investment in these countries compared to the others. 
The policy implications of these results are two-folds. First, the issue of the dual-
citizenship recognition would be taken into account among all the strategies designed 
domestically and internationally in favor of sustaining remittances. Second, the recognition of 
the dual citizenship also enters the debate on the ways to increase the benefits of remittance 
inflows by encouraging their reinvestment. The paper shows that countries which have 
already allowed getting a dual-citizenship perform better in terms of more investment-
motivated remittances.  
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.02 
 19
REFERENCES 
Abdih, Y., Dagher, J., Chami, R. and Montiel, P. (2008) Remittances and institutions: Are 
remittances a curse?, IMF Working Papers 08/29, International Monetary Fund. 
Adams, R. and Page, J. (2005) Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in 
developing countries?, World Development, 33, 1645-1669. 
Adams Jr., R. H. (2009) The determinants of international remittances in developing 
countries, World Development, 37, 93-103. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Pozo, S. (2004) Workers’ remittances and the real exchange rate: a 
paradox of gifts, World Development, 32, 1407-1417. 
Barajas, A., Chami, R., Hakura, D. and Montiel, P. (2010) Workers’ remittances and the 
equilibrium real exchange rate: Theory and evidence, IMF Working Papers 10/287, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Blatter, J., Erdmann, S. and Schwanke, K. (2009) Acceptance of dual citizenship: Empirical 
data and political contexts, Working Paper Series “Global Governance and 
Democracy” 02, Institute of Political Science, University of Lucerne. 
Boll, A. M (2007) Multiple Nationality and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Bugamelli, M. and Paternò, F. (2009) Output growth volatility and remittances, Economica. 
Chami, R., Gapen, M., Barajas, A., Montiel, P., Cosimano, T. and Fullenkamp, C. (2008) 
Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances, IMF Occasional Paper 259, pp. 1-92. 
Chami, R., Hakura, D. and Montiel, P. (2009) Remittances: An automatic output stabilizer?, 
IMF Working Paper No. 09/91. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.02 
 20
Combes, J.-L. and Ebeke, C. (2010) Remittances and household consumption instability in 
developing countries, World Development, Forthcoming. 
David, A. (2010) How do international financial flows to developing countries respond to 
natural disasters?, IMF Working Papers 10/166, International Monetary Fund. 
Frankel, J. A. (2009) Are bilateral remittances countercyclical?, NBER Working Papers 
15419, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Freund, C. and Spatafora, N. (2008) Remittances, transaction costs, and informality, Journal 
of Development Economics, 86, 356-366. 
Giuliano, P. and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2009) Remittances, financial development, and growth, 
Journal of Development Economics, 90, 144-152. 
Leblang, D. (2010) Harnessing the Diaspora: Dual citizenship, Migrant Remittances and 
Return. Unpublished. 
Lueth, E. and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2008) Determinants of bilateral remittance flows, The B.E. 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 8. 
Mohapatra, S., Joseph, G. and Ratha, D. (2009) Remittances and natural disasters: ex-post 
response and contribution to ex-ante preparedness, Policy Research Working Paper 
Series 4972, The World Bank. 
Nunn, N. and Wantchekon, L. (2009) The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa, 
NBER Working Papers 14783, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Pagan, A. (1984) Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with generated regressors, 
International Economic Review, pp. 221-247. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.02 
 21
Renshon, S. (2005) The 50% American. Immigration and National Identity in an Age of 
Terror. Georgetown University Press, Washington/DC. 
Sayan, S. (2006) Business cycles and workers' remittances: How do migrant workers respond 
to cyclical movements of GDP at home?, IMF Working Papers 06/52, International 
Monetary Fund. 
Sejersen, T. (2008) “I Vow to Thee My Countries” The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 
21st Century, International Migration Review, 42, 523-549. 
Serven, L. (2003) Real-exchange-rate uncertainty and private investment in LDCs, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 85, 212-218. 
United States Office of Personnel Management, Investigations Service (2001): Citizenship 
Laws of the World. <http://www.opm.gov/extra/investigati/IS-o1-pfd> 
Vadean, F-P. (2007) Citizenship Status and Remittances: Evidence from German Micro Data, 
ARI Working Papers Series, 89. 
World Bank (2011). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2nd Edition, The World Bank 
Group. 
Yang, D. (2008) Coping with disaster: The impact of hurricanes on international financial 
flows, 1970-2002, Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 8, 1903-1903. 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.02 
 22
Table 1: Direct effect of the dual-citizenship law (‘full recognition’ drawn from Blatter et al., 2009) on remittance inflows.  
      Excluding ‘switchers’ 
 Rpc RY log Rpc log RY  Rpc RY log Rpc log RY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Dual-citizenship dummy 43.10** 1.678* 0.886** 0.963**  47.40** 1.433 0.891* 0.975** 
 (19.81) (0.998) (0.440) (0.436)  (21.70) (1.106) (0.480) (0.475) 
log Stock of Emigrants (aged 25+) 10.84* 0.406 0.296** 0.285**  12.94* 0.477 0.324** 0.313** 
 (6.206) (0.267) (0.119) (0.118)  (7.114) (0.301) (0.131) (0.129) 
Growth in the host countries 678.4 52.52* 18.26* 15.63  806.5 54.18* 18.44* 15.52 
 (460.9) (30.16) (10.05) (9.871)  (513.9) (32.54) (11.00) (10.79) 
log GDP per capita in receiving countries 21.87 -1.577* 0.195 -0.818***  23.27 -1.436 0.228 -0.787*** 
 (16.42) (0.917) (0.280) (0.279)  (17.95) (0.986) (0.298) (0.297) 
Demographic dependency ratio 4.521*** 0.200** 3.492** 3.856**  4.656*** 0.204** 3.620** 3.960** 
 (1.593) (0.0781) (1.644) (1.575)  (1.722) (0.0837) (1.775) (1.709) 
Financial development 2.862** 0.0805*** 1.043** 0.916**  2.840** 0.0796*** 1.036** 0.899** 
 (1.298) (0.0238) (0.411) (0.397)  (1.326) (0.0242) (0.424) (0.408) 
Constant -680.4*** -8.167 -21.08** -17.34*  -721.0** -10.37 -22.09** -18.19* 
 (252.5) (10.68) (9.155) (9.019)  (278.9) (11.72) (10.04) (9.899) 
          
Observations 103 102 98 97  96 95 92 91 
R² 0.442 0.363 0.477 0.437  0.444 0.357 0.480 0.430 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies are included in all equations. Data are averaged for the period 2000-2009. Rpc: 
Remittances in per capita $ US, RY: remittance in percentage of GDP. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Direct effect of the dual-citizenship law (‘Broad recognition’ drawn from Blatter et al., 2009) on remittance inflows.  
      Excluding ‘switchers’ 
 Rpc RY log Rpc log RY  Rpc RY log Rpc log RY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Dual-citizenship dummy 60.26** 3.233** 1.021** 1.090**  65.89** 3.354* 1.038** 1.115** 
 (25.46) (1.540) (0.422) (0.421)  (28.99) (1.803) (0.463) (0.462) 
log Stock of Emigrants (aged 25+) 10.32* 0.357 0.294** 0.283**  12.02* 0.404 0.315** 0.303** 
 (6.090) (0.258) (0.115) (0.114)  (6.884) (0.283) (0.128) (0.126) 
Growth in the host countries 676.9 54.90** 18.28* 15.64  784.9 58.02* 17.87* 14.88 
 (469.1) (27.23) (9.761) (9.640)  (520.9) (29.19) (10.62) (10.44) 
log GDP per capita in receiving countries 20.62 -1.671* 0.179 -0.834***  20.92 -1.614* 0.198 -0.819*** 
 (15.27) (0.881) (0.275) (0.274)  (16.24) (0.925) (0.292) (0.290) 
Demographic dependency ratio 4.241*** 0.188*** 3.032* 3.344**  4.285*** 0.190** 3.090* 3.373** 
 (1.500) (0.0703) (1.573) (1.514)  (1.583) (0.0721) (1.689) (1.625) 
Financial development 2.856** 0.0785*** 1.090*** 0.975**  2.819** 0.0757*** 1.051** 0.922** 
 (1.273) (0.0236) (0.399) (0.386)  (1.306) (0.0246) (0.416) (0.401) 
Constant -654.6*** -6.635 -19.33** -15.42*  -675.5** -7.650 -19.74** -15.62 
 (243.2) (10.01) (8.885) (8.773)  (264.0) (10.54) (9.697) (9.556) 
          
Observations 103 102 98 97  96 95 92 91 
R² 0.457 0.404 0.489 0.452  0.461 0.400 0.491 0.444 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ‘Broad recognition’ of the dual-citizenship records countries with a ‘fully recognition’ and countries which 
tolerate or accept a dual-citizenship with treaty nations and finally countries with a limited acceptance (see Blatter et al., 2009 for more details). Regional 
dummies are included in all equations. Data are averaged for the period 2000-2009.  Rpc: Remittances in per capita $ US, RY: remittance in percentage of 
GDP. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Total effect of the dual-citizenship law (‘full recognition’ drawn from Blatter et al., 2009) on remittance inflows.  
      Excluding ‘switchers’ 
 Rpc RY log Rpc log RY  Rpc RY log Rpc log RY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Dual-citizenship dummy 58.75*** 2.260** 1.388*** 1.444***  66.61*** 2.134* 1.459*** 1.521*** 
 (20.80) (1.029) (0.441) (0.437)  (23.10) (1.172) (0.493) (0.489) 
log Stock of Emigrants (aged 25+), residuals 10.84* 0.406 0.296** 0.285**  12.94* 0.477 0.324** 0.313** 
 (6.206) (0.267) (0.119) (0.118)  (7.114) (0.301) (0.131) (0.129) 
Growth in the host countries 678.4 52.52* 18.26* 15.63  806.5 54.18* 18.44* 15.52 
 (460.9) (30.16) (10.05) (9.871)  (513.9) (32.54) (11.00) (10.79) 
log GDP per capita in receiving countries 21.87 -1.577* 0.195 -0.818***  23.27 -1.436 0.228 -0.787*** 
 (16.42) (0.917) (0.280) (0.279)  (17.95) (0.986) (0.298) (0.297) 
Demographic dependency ratio 4.521*** 0.200** 3.492** 3.856**  4.656*** 0.204** 3.620** 3.960** 
 (1.593) (0.0781) (1.644) (1.575)  (1.722) (0.0837) (1.775) (1.709) 
Financial development 2.862** 0.0805*** 1.043** 0.916**  2.840** 0.0796*** 1.036** 0.899** 
 (1.298) (0.0238) (0.411) (0.397)  (1.326) (0.0242) (0.424) (0.408) 
Constant -566.1** -3.882 -17.97** -14.35*  -585.8** -5.390 -18.73** -14.95 
 (220.9) (9.549) (8.597) (8.448)  (238.8) (10.17) (9.325) (9.169) 
          
Observations 103 102 98 97  96 95 92 91 
R² 0.442 0.363 0.477 0.437  0.444 0.357 0.480 0.430 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies are included in all equations. Data are averaged for the period 2000-2009. Rpc: Remittances 
in per capita $ US, RY: remittance in percentage of GDP. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.02 
 25
Table 4: Total effect of the dual-citizenship law (‘Broad recognition’ drawn from Blatter et al., 2009) on remittance inflows.  
      Excluding ‘switchers’ 
 Rpc RY log Rpc log RY  Rpc RY log Rpc log RY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Dual-citizenship dummy 74.78*** 3.730** 1.502*** 1.550***  83.54*** 3.941** 1.578*** 1.632*** 
 (26.38) (1.549) (0.435) (0.434)  (30.47) (1.846) (0.481) (0.479) 
log Stock of Emigrants (aged 25+), residuals 10.32* 0.357 0.294** 0.283**  12.02* 0.404 0.315** 0.303** 
 (6.090) (0.258) (0.115) (0.114)  (6.884) (0.283) (0.128) (0.126) 
Growth in the host countries 676.9 54.90** 18.28* 15.64  784.9 58.02* 17.87* 14.88 
 (469.1) (27.23) (9.761) (9.640)  (520.9) (29.19) (10.62) (10.44) 
log GDP per capita in receiving countries 20.62 -1.671* 0.179 -0.834***  20.92 -1.614* 0.198 -0.819*** 
 (15.27) (0.881) (0.275) (0.274)  (16.24) (0.925) (0.292) (0.290) 
Demographic dependency ratio 4.241*** 0.188*** 3.032* 3.344**  4.285*** 0.190** 3.090* 3.373** 
 (1.500) (0.0703) (1.573) (1.514)  (1.583) (0.0721) (1.689) (1.625) 
Financial development 2.856** 0.0785*** 1.090*** 0.975**  2.819** 0.0757*** 1.051** 0.922** 
 (1.273) (0.0236) (0.399) (0.386)  (1.306) (0.0246) (0.416) (0.401) 
Constant -546.8** -2.907 -16.28* -12.49  -551.1** -3.473 -16.51* -12.51 
 (213.9) (9.094) (8.310) (8.187)  (227.5) (9.355) (8.973) (8.819) 
          
Observations 103 102 98 97  96 95 92 91 
R² 0.457 0.404 0.489 0.452  0.461 0.400 0.491 0.444 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ‘Broad recognition’ of the dual-citizenship records countries with a ‘fully recognition’ and countries which 
tolerate or accept a dual-citizenship with treaty nations and finally countries with a limited acceptance (see Blatter et al., 2009 for more details). Regional 
dummies are included in all equations. Data are averaged for the period 2000-2009.  Rpc: Remittances in per capita $ US, RY: remittance in percentage of 
GDP. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Dual-citizenship (‘Full recognition’ drawn Blatter et al., 2009), remittances and private investment. 
  OLS Remittance First-stage IV IV-excluding switchers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Remittances  -0.0225  -0.112 -0.00548 
  (0.153)  (0.273) (0.289) 
Remittances*Dual-citizenship   0.438*  0.666** 0.567* 
  (0.225)  (0.297) (0.308) 
Dual-citizenship dummy  -2.290* -3.071 -3.210* -2.591 
  (1.295) (3.009) (1.690) (1.785) 
Inflation  -0.0757* -0.0189 -0.0621 -0.0666 
  (0.0425) (0.0204) (0.0416) (0.0463) 
Private credit  0.0353 -0.00779 0.0308 0.0272 
  (0.0377) (0.0173) (0.0403) (0.0424) 
Public debt service-to-GDP  -0.0821 -0.132 -0.152 -0.0527 
  (0.186) (0.132) (0.214) (0.254) 
Public investment  0.0765 -0.205* -0.150 -0.160 
  (0.303) (0.119) (0.253) (0.257) 
Trade openness  -0.00768 0.0242* -0.00494 -0.00243 
  (0.0220) (0.0136) (0.0234) (0.0239) 
Political stability  2.428** -1.114* 2.781*** 2.748*** 
  (1.041) (0.591) (0.976) (0.933) 
GDP per capita growth in host countries   29.34   
   (46.39)   
Remittances-to-GDP in 1995   0.336***   
   (0.0732)   
Remittances in 1995*Dual-citizenship   0.431***   
   (0.128)   
Growth in host countries*Dual-citizenship   91.19   
   (67.09)   
Intercept  15.92*** 1.119 18.91*** 18.66*** 
  (3.469) (2.658) (3.043) (3.210) 
      
Observations  89 73 73 68 
R²  0.341 0.661 0.310 0.308 
Remittance instrumentation F-stat :   15.23  14.02 
Remittances*Dual-citizenship instrumentation F-stat :    16.80  24.35 
Hansen OID:p-value    0.553 0.775 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies are included in all equations. Data are averaged for the period 2000-2009. The 
dependent variable is the private investment-to-GDP ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Dual-citizenship (‘Broad recognition’ drawn Blatter et al., 2009), remittances and private investment. 
  OLS Remittance First-stage IV IV-excluding switchers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Remittances  -0.250  -0.120 -0.0719 
  (0.285)  (0.305) (0.323) 
Remittances*Dual-citizenship   0.546*  0.633** 0.589** 
  (0.310)  (0.291) (0.296) 
Dual-citizenship dummy  -1.676 -1.749 -1.881 -1.450 
  (1.434) (3.638) (1.699) (1.829) 
Inflation  -0.0861* -0.0194 -0.0607 -0.0642 
  (0.0432) (0.0193) (0.0415) (0.0463) 
Private credit  0.0306 -0.00958 0.0234 0.0205 
  (0.0382) (0.0182) (0.0398) (0.0427) 
Public debt service-to-GDP  -0.0722 -0.101 -0.159 -0.0610 
  (0.188) (0.129) (0.213) (0.253) 
Public investment  0.0188 -0.196* -0.129 -0.152 
  (0.307) (0.115) (0.263) (0.266) 
Trade openness  -0.00889 0.0256* -0.00517 -0.00186 
  (0.0222) (0.0139) (0.0242) (0.0246) 
Political stability  2.548** -1.123* 2.725*** 2.649*** 
  (1.087) (0.593) (0.981) (0.959) 
GDP per capita growth in host countries   19.76   
   (60.72)   
Remittances-to-GDP in 1995   0.305***   
   (0.0557)   
Remittances in 1995*Dual-citizenship   0.475***   
   (0.115)   
Growth in host countries*Dual-citizenship   57.21   
   (89.17)   
Intercept  17.16*** 1.135 19.00*** 18.93*** 
  (3.638) (3.071) (3.116) (3.219) 
      
Observations  89 73 73 68 
R²  0.336 0.661 0.319 0.325 
Remittance instrumentation F-stat :   16.17  14.13 
Remittances*Dual-citizenship instrumentation F-stat :    18.23  21.32 
Hansen OID:p-value    0.866 0.586 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ‘Broad recognition’ of the dual-citizenship takes countries with a ‘fully recognition’ and countries 
which tolerate or accept a dual-citizenship with treaty nations and finally countries with a limited acceptance (see Blatter et al., 2009 for more 
details). Regional dummies are included in all equations. Data are averaged for the period 2000-2009. The dependent variable is the private 
investment-to-GDP ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Remittances per capita $US 127 81.40 147.04 0 1098.00 
Remittances (% GDP) 125 4.16 5.58 0 29.50 
Private investment (%GDP) 113 15.77 6.60 2.71 39.16 
Dual-citizenship ('Full') 132 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Dual-citizenship ('Broad') 132 0.45 0.50 0 1 
GDP per capita growth in host countries 139 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.16 
log Migrant stock 131 10.98 1.97 5.73 15.68 
log GDP per capita 153 7.09 1.18 4.70 10.25 
Dependency ratio (%) 154 67.81 16.77 41.25 108.29 
M2 (%GDP) 135 42.13 31.18 6.08 207.95 
Inflation (%) 157 10.45 18.64 1.36 208.84 
Public debt service (%GDP) 122 5.10 4.34 0.11 27.62 
Private credit (%GDP) 135 30.32 25.40 1.96 138.02 
Public investment (%GDP) 115 7.21 4.44 1.56 29.61 
Trade openness 135 84.39 36.44 0.67 200.46 
Political stability 135 -0.40 0.87 -2.67 1.33 
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Table A2: List of countries (104) in the sample and their status on the dual-citizenship. 
Country Full Broad Country Full Broad Country Full Broad Country Full Broad 
Albania 1 1 Dominican Republic 1 1 Latvia 1 1 Peru 1 1 
Angola 0 0 Ecuador 1 1 Lebanon 1 1 Philippines 1 1 
Argentina 0 1 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 1 Lesotho 0 0 Poland 1 1 
Armenia 0 1 El Salvador 1 1 Liberia 0 0 Romania 1 1 
Azerbaijan 0 0 Fiji 0 0 Libya 0 0 Russian Federation 1 1 
Bangladesh 0 1 Gabon 0 0 Lithuania 0 0 Rwanda 0 0 
Belarus 1 1 Gambia, The 0 0 Madagascar 0 0 Senegal 0 0 
Belize 1 1 Georgia 0 0 Malawi 0 0 Sierra Leone 0 0 
Benin 1 1 Ghana 1 1 Malaysia 0 0 Solomon Islands 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 Grenada 1 1 Maldives 1 1 Sri Lanka 1 1 
Botswana 0 0 Guatemala 0 1 Mali 1 1 Sudan 0 0 
Brazil 1 1 Guinea 0 0 Mauritius 1 1 Suriname 0 0 
Bulgaria 1 1 Guinea-Bissau 0 0 Mexico 1 1 Swaziland 0 0 
Burkina Faso 1 1 Guyana 0 0 Moldova 1 1 Syrian Arab Republic 1 1 
Burundi 0 0 Haiti 0 0 Mongolia 0 0 Tajikistan 0 1 
Cambodia 0 0 Honduras 1 1 Morocco 1 1 Tanzania 0 0 
Cameroon 0 0 India 0 0 Mozambique 0 0 Togo 1 1 
Cape Verde 1 1 Indonesia 0 0 Namibia 0 0 Tonga 0 1 
China 0 0 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 0 Nepal 0 0 Tunisia 1 1 
Colombia 1 1 Iraq 1 1 Nicaragua 0 1 Turkey 1 1 
Congo, Rep. 0 0 Jamaica 1 1 Niger 0 0 Uganda 0 0 
Costa Rica 1 1 Jordan 1 1 Nigeria 1 1 Ukraine 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 1 Kazakhstan 0 0 Pakistan 0 0 Uruguay 1 1 
Croatia 0 0 Kenya 0 0 Panama 1 1 Vanuatu 0 0 
Djibouti 0 0 Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 0 0 Venezuela, RB 0 0 
      Paraguay 0 1 Yemen, Rep. 0 0 
         Zambia 0 0 
